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Abstract 
The role of former United States President William Jefferson Clinton in the Northern Ireland 
peace process has been widely acknowledged as an example of risk-taking, political 
leadership and diplomacy that is representative of strategic post-Cold War aims. However, 
the tendency to see Clinton’s role from the perspective of international and global policy 
objectives has hindered consideration of his motivational role in the Northern Ireland peace 
process, as well as he how moved between encouragement and intervention to help the 
political parties reach a settlement. This article, which draws from an extended interview 
conducted with Clinton in 2017, seeks to develop a more comprehensive picture of Clinton’s 
participation in the peace process and argues that his success in helping to broker the 
Northern Ireland peace deal came from a connection between motivational and interventional 
roles. It also argues that the cumulative effect of these two types of engagement enabled him 
to help convince others of the need to take risks for peace and gave him greater influence and, 
indeed, leverage over the peace process as a result. 
Introduction 
In a speech that he gave in Belfast, Northern Ireland’s capital city, during his first visit to 
Northern Ireland in November 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton expressed hope for peace 




together the symbolism of two competing cultures, Clinton proclaimed how “In the land of 
the harp and the fiddle,” “the fife and the Lambeg drum, two proud traditions are coming 
together in the harmonies of peace.” (1995). Such a peace, Clinton continued, would require 
the people of Northern Ireland to have “open minds” and recognize engagement in dialogue 
as “an act of strength and common sense” rather than an act of surrender. 
Those who refused to relinquish past enmity, Clinton warned, would “Never escape 
the dead-end street of violence. But you, the vast majority, Protestant and Catholic alike, 
must not allow the ship of peace to sink on the rocks of old habits and hard grudges” (Clinton 
1995). He went on “Your destiny is for you to determine. Only you can decide between 
division and unity, between hard lives and high hopes, only you can create a lasting peace. It 
takes courage to let go of familiar divisions. It takes faith to walk down a new road” and 
“strength to keep moving forward” (Clinton 1995). Embracing change, for Clinton, therefore 
meant imagining a future without the animosities of the past, and his speech was designed to 
give emphasis to that possibility through emotional appeal. 
In contrast, and in a speech he delivered in 2003 (published in 2013), Clinton 
identified three imperatives that were representative of his own involvement in the Northern 
Ireland peace process. The first is that it is necessary to work through difficulties if one is to 
build friendships and deepen relationships. The second is that one should not presume to 
know the positions and concerns of parties in conflict but engage in intense listening to learn 
and understand those positions and concerns. And the third is that one should understand that 
“all politics is local,” and so remain alert to the impact of local reactions on wider national 
issues (Clinton 2013.).  
The two speeches above highlight two kinds of leadership: one motivational and the 




first has hope and vision to depict a better future and the second presents the practical 
considerations needed to reach that end.  
The first speech, which Clinton gave two years into his presidency, provided a 
spiritual emphasis on the peace process and was theatrical in presentation. The second 
speech, which Clinton gave two years after leaving office, offers instruction on the mechanics 
needed to make peace real. This tendency to inspire in relation to political calculation 
indicates a possible interaction between the personal and the political that is of concern in this 
article.  
 Though Clinton’s intervention in Northern Ireland many have come from a personal 
fascination about ending that conflict and was influenced by his own civil rights convictions 
(Dempsey 2004: 199), it was also representative of a wider strategic shift that emerged in the 
new post-Cold War world. Now freed from the enduring threat of communism, and the 
traditional U.S. policy of containment that had been used to confront that threat, Clinton was 
able to extend U.S. influence through a process of ‘democratic enlargement’ (Brinkley 1997) 
and use economic development to generate diplomatic advantage because of it (MacLeod 
2016:). This new period gave Clinton the opportunity to challenge the expectations of 
diplomatic conduct (as was the case, discussed more fully later, with the British when Clinton 
granted Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams a visa to enter the U.S. in 1994 (Renwick 2019: 
211-218)) and gave him more flexibility to deal with international affairs as a result (O’Grady 
1996: 6).  
Given that the post-Cold War world made it harder to sustain claims that national 
political interests would remain unchanged because of those (particularly communists) 
perceived as a permanent threat (Cox 1998: 60) Clinton proposed to make foreign 
policymaking more proactive and less reactive (Brinkley 1997: 114) and used market 




Though Clinton stressed the value of relationships and “the human drama of the peace 
process” (MacLeod 2016: 235), and this indicated the value for him of soft power and 
personal diplomacy (Riley 2016: 230), it is clear that the process developed through intensive 
political activity. The origins of it emerged in the late 1980s as a series of confidential 
dialogues, strategic statements, and confidential meetings held in Northern Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland (Hennessey 2000; Spencer 2008; 2015a; 
2015b). But, the process can also be seen as a response to a centuries-old religious conflict 
between Protestants and Catholics that evolved into a violent struggle between Protestant 
unionists seeking to remain British and Catholic nationalists seeking unification with the Irish 
Republic.  
During the conflict’s modern period known as “the Troubles,” which began as a 
response to civil rights discrimination against Catholics in the late 1960s, two serious 
attempts to build peace took place that failed to bring about a substantive resolution. The 
first, when moderate unionists and nationalists agreed to form a power-sharing Northern 
Ireland Executive at Sunningdale, England in 1974, that foundered because of wider unionist 
resistance to what was seen as a dilution of political and social power and the British 
Government’s failure to adequately support it (Anderson 1994; Hennessey 2015; McDaid 
2016; Dorr 2017). And second, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, when the British and 
Irish governments collaborated to bring about (FitzGerald 1991; Lillis and Goodall 2010), 
closer ties between the Republic of Ireland and the UK through a framework that prioritized 
self-determination, consent, and democratic participation (Bew and Gillespie 1999).  
Though the Anglo-Irish Agreement allowed greater Irish involvement in the affairs of 
Northern Ireland and presented opportunities for nationalists to try and work for a united 
Ireland because of that involvement, it was this very possibility that angered unionists and led 




the British government effectively froze for four years until, in 1989, British Secretary of 
State Peter Brooke encouraged unionists to engage in a talks process to try and negotiate a 
new power-sharing arrangement in Northern Ireland that would address fears about Irish 
interference there. It would be these talks that would later lead to the later more 
comprehensive negotiations that resulted in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 (Bloomfield 
1998). 
Interestingly, it was the failure of Sunningdale that prompted Irish political and 
diplomatic pressure on President Jimmy Carter to announce an initiative on Ireland based on 
human rights and economic investment in 1977 (Dumbrell 1993: 130-141; FitzPatrick 2017: 
62-70). The Anglo-Irish Agreement was also achieved because of presidential pressure, with 
President Ronald Reagan exploiting his strong personal relationship with British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in order to get her to support the agreement. Thatcher later 
admitted: “It was pressure from the Americans that made me sign that Agreement” 
(McAlpine 1997: 272). 
Unlike Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which, in the case of the former 
was negotiated by moderate unionists and nationalists, and, in the case of the latter, was 
negotiated by the British and Irish governments, the peace process was embracive in design 
and intent. The architects of the process recognized that for peace to hold it had to be as 
inclusive as possible and that even the proponents of violence needed to come into the 
democratic process and agree to non-violent representation – and to persuade their followers 
to do the same. For Sinn Fein and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) U.S. 
involvement would be central in this transformation, and Clinton skilfully persuaded 
republican leaders to appreciate the risks that they needed to take to achieve peace, 
acknowledging that this was more likely to happen if republicans were part of a broader 




In this article, I will seek to explore how Clinton used his motivational and political 
skills to persuade political players to reach a peace settlement and so claim diplomatic 
success that was consistent with his own political foreign policy goals. First, I describe the 
political context that informed Clinton’s actions before offering some tentative thoughts on 
the role of mediation in negotiations more generally. That discussion is followed by an 
interview with Clinton in which he describes his involvement in the Northern Ireland peace 
process. 
 
Clinton’s Involvement in Northern Ireland: The Political Context  
President Clinton made a commitment to become involved in the Northern Ireland issue 
before he was even elected president. In April 1992, on the campaign trail, he attended an 
Irish-American forum in New York and was asked if he would grant Gerry Adams of Sinn 
Fein (the republican party believed to be the political wing of the PIRA) a visa to enter the 
U.S. if he were to become president. This would help internationalise Sinn Fein and enable its 
leaders make a more compelling case to their supporters that politics would be more 
beneficial to their objective of achieving Irish unity than violence (many accusers also 
claimed that Adams had been a member of the PIRA, the secret paramilitary organization, 
which contributed to the controversy over granting him a visa). This move had also put 
candidate Clinton’s interest in the Irish peace process more firmly on the political agenda in 
Washington (O’Dowd 2010; O’Hanlon 1998). 
Representatives from legal and media worlds, as well as leaders of prominent Irish-
American groups (O’Clery 1997: 13-32; Mallie and McKittrick 2001) (and where 
commitments agreed by Clinton in 1992 on the campaign trail were later acknowledged by 




Clinton at the forum to accept the need for an Adams visa, which he did while being unaware 
of the political difficulties it would later create (Mallie and McKittrick 2001). Clinton also 
committed to an economic envoy for Northern Ireland to source investment opportunities and 
contribute economic support as part of a broader “commercial diplomacy” initiative to build 
economic incentives into the political process (Soderberg 2005).  
The issues surrounding a visa for Adams were especially contentious given the belief 
that Adams was acting not just as a Sinn Fein politician but as one of the most senior 
members of the PIRA, and it was not granted until February 1994, more than one full year 
into the Clinton administration (indicating how contentious this was). Those who opposed the 
visa within the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Justice, along with 
intense British diplomatic activity to try and block it, reflected the view that it would harm 
the special relationship between the U.S. and the UK and also suggest to international 
audiences that the U.S. was softening its stance on terrorism.  
However, following intense behind-the-scenes activity, in January 1994, some fifty 
signatories from the United States Senate and the House of Representatives led by Democrat 
Senator Edward M. Kennedyi sent a letter of support urging Clinton to grant the visa and 
encouraging him to help facilitate the emerging dialogue. The intense activity to secure a visa 
for Adams was in part to pressure both the PIRA and the British to engage in a serious 
negotiation process (Adams 1997: 65-66). Letting Adams visit the U.S. conferred some 
degree of legitimacy on the republican cause, while enabling greater American influence over 
Sinn Fein in the process (Clinton 2004). 
Although Clinton’s decision to engage more directly with the peace process did no 
harm to his popularity among Irish-American voters and this may have helped motivate his 
engagement (Clinton 2004), it this does not appear to have been the primary impetus. Indeed, 




claims that he represented only the preferences of Irish-Americans, which were largely 
republican-leaning, and minimising possible accusations that he was favouring those with 
most to gain from the changes that a peace process might bring (Guelke 1996; Dumbrell 
1995: 125).  
Working with the political parties and the British and Irish governments in this way 
allowed the U.S. to “wield its influence more broadly” and indicated an intention to “nudge 
rather than instruct, to entice rather than threaten” (Hazleton 2000: 119). Clinton’s Deputy 
National Security Advisor Nancy Soderberg (2005: 74) wrote that such an approach “became 
critical in building confidence among the parties” because “while neither side trusted any 
commitments made to each other, any commitments made to the U.S., especially the 
President, could be trusted”, reinforcing an image of the U.S. as a credible third-party to 
negotiations.  
American involvement brought leverage to bear on Sinn Fein and the PIRA to deliver 
a ceasefire in August 1994 (O’Dowd 2010). Following the advice of those such as Nancy 
Soderberg, Tony Lake (Clinton’s National Security Advisor) and Senator Edward Kennedy 
Clinton chose to override the advice of the United States Department of State that he should 
not disturb the country’s status quo position of support for British policy on Northern Ireland. 
As part of a new strategy emphasizing “non-traditional, non-executive sources of power” 
(Lynch 2004: 142), Clinton and his team persuasively represented established foreign policy 
positions as “tired and stale” and adopted a new “policy entrepreneurialism” to shape and 
inform the conduct of foreign relations (Lynch 2004).  
That Clinton was able to upset the British by granting the Adams visa (Major 1999; 
Seitz 1998) and then quickly overcome the resulting tensions to pursue a productive 
relationship illustrates how he viewed political relations not just in terms of policy, but 




Ireland during his two terms in office. His first one, in November 1995, in which he was 
greeted with considerable public acclaim, was especially representative of his convergent 
political and personal diplomacy approach and its success can be seen as a justification of 
that approach (Birney and O’Neill 1997). 
With his visit to Northern Ireland, Clinton also sought to eclipse the memory of recent 
diplomatic setbacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In September 1993 he had welcomed 
Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Mahmoud Abbas, the negotiator for the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader, to the White House for the signing of the 
Oslo Accords. The now iconic image of Clinton with arms outstretched embracing Rabin and 
PLO leader Yasir Arafat was symbolic of his peace-making agenda. But the Oslo process 
came to a halt when Rabin was assassinated just a few weeks before Clinton’s visit to 
Northern Ireland. 
Furthermore, Clinton’s commitment to Northern Ireland did not wane after the Canary 
Wharf bombing of February 1996 - which Clinton discusses in the following interview – and 
indeed intensified following the elections of Tony Blair as Prime Minister of the UK and 
Bertie Ahern as Taoiseach (prime minister) of Ireland in spring 1997. To illustrate this 
intensification U.S. aides working with Senator George Mitchell in the negotiations told the 
political players that if an agreement was to be reached it would almost certainly be 
concluded quickly (this was particularly the case once Mitchell had formally announced to 
the political parties at the end of March a deadline for agreement of 9 April 1998 (Mitchell 
1999:144-146)), and so full and committed participation would be vital if interests were to be 
protected in any final outcome (Pope and Pozorski 2009). The speed of the process in its 
concluding phase and the anxiety this created for the parties led to that Clinton being 
constantly available by phone to reassure political leaders and respond to their difficulties. He 




with those who were dealing with internal party differences about what to accept and not 
accept (this was particularly so with unionist concerns; see Mallie and McKittrick 2001: 248).   
          The political parties in the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 
were participants in a new atmosphere of possibility that reflected the ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ of the period (Spencer 2010). Further, the inclusive nature of the process meant 
new forms of political representation (such as the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, 
which had formed to be part of the negotiations (Fearon 1999)) could develop. Tony Blair’s 
chief of staff Jonathan Powell stressed that the Good Friday Agreement “was an agreement to 
disagree” (Powell 2008: 108) since it provided the space for different interpretations of the 
agreement that each political party could use to claim success and bring its respective 
constituency support along. However, once the Good Friday Agreement was reached and 
clearer understanding of what it would need to implement became apparent, so political 
positions hardened sharpened. At that moment ambiguity changed from being a constructive 
influence to a destructive one (this can be seen from the problems that came after the 
agreement with regards to weapons decommissioning and new policing and justice structures 
that were not dealt with at the time the agreement was signed (Powell 2008: 2011-308)).  
          What we might also note with regards to Clinton’s participation as the agreement got 
closer, and indeed afterwards, is how his role became more interventionist once the struggles 
over substance and detail deepened and the disputes over what parts of the agreement meant 
intensified (Mallie and McKittrick 2001: 248, 269,275). The patience that had been shown to 
all the political parties and had been personified by the role of Senator Mitchell, who for 
years had listened to endless debates about procedure and detail then changed, as momentum 
switched towards acceptance or not of a deal. At such a time diplomacy can shift from being 
empathetic and slow to intense and even coercive if participants are to finally reach a 




Mediation and the Personal Context 
According to William Zartman and Sadia Touval (1985), a useful mediation skill is the 
ability to make unattractive propositions look attractive, particularly in situations of 
intransigence and stalemate. To create this attractiveness a neutral third-party, who shares 
none of the parties’ fears and enmities, can better help parties bridge positions because he 
does not have vested interests and so can act fairly. He is also able to motivate by presenting 
risks as opportunities, turning points of mutual contention into points of mutual interest and 
can better facilitate consensus on the need for movement.  
Yet the mediator’s persuasiveness also surely relates to the intensity of her personal 
engagement as well as her skills in constructing a powerful moral narrative that clearly 
describes the benefits of ending conflict and why and how the gains justify the inevitable 
costs. As part of this encounter the mediator seeks to generate trust, and respect and her 
ongoing commitment reinforces her trustworthiness and respectfulness. 
That said, the successful mediator must not only advocate positive change, but help to 
personify that possibility and show that he too is prepared to take risks and so that the process 
is not without costs for him either (as noted Clinton had done this with the Adams visa 
(Dempsey 2004: 204)). Indeed, he must make change not only desirable but necessary, and to 
do so he must impress on the participants the need for urgency to conclude a resolution. Yet 
to gain a wider acceptance of this urgency perhaps he must also emphasize political decisions 
as emotional convictions and so encourage participants to move when their political impulse 
is to resist moving. He must present risks as essential steps and help participants take those 
steps to show he is trusted as a participant in the change he advocates. He must therefore 
demonstrate a personal commitment to what he is telling others to do and continue to try to 




It is important to note that mediation styles vary with personalities, circumstances and 
strategies. As Curran, Sebenius and Watkins discovered when they compared the approach of 
Mitchell in Northern Ireland to that of Richard Holbrooke who negotiated the Dayton 
Accords that ended the Bosnian conflict, Mitchell’s approach was one of patience and 
gradualism while Holbrooke’s approach was more aggressive (Curran, Sebenius and Watkins 
2004). Making comparisons here is not without problems given the differences of the two 
processes. Dayton was conducted speedily in a remote location, was focussed more on 
bringing about a ceasefire and ensuring separation of the warring factions, and was used by 
western peacekeeping forces to monitor an end to hostilities by holding the factions to 
account if they violated the terms of the agreement. It was also dealing with a much wider 
problem of potential escalation (Jackson 2007: 197, 201) than was the case in Northern 
Ireland, where tensions were more contained, the conflict had been running much longer and 
the climate had been discernibly shifting towards a growing receptiveness for a peace 
settlement since the late 1980s (Hennessey 2000).  
           For Clinton, emotional diplomacy and motivation were vital to his credibility as a 
mediator in the peace process (Hall 2015). Clinton saw that emotion was central to political 
transformation but he also had to show conviction. By making himself available at times of 
great inconvenience (such as staying up all night to take phone calls from the political 
leaders) he was able to develop trust and confidence in his role (I have interviewed many of 
the key players in the peace process and their opinion on Clinton’s role is overwhelmingly 
positive (Spencer 2019)).  
On this, and as Zartman and Berman note, “Trust is enhanced if a negotiator can 
demonstrate a genuine interest in trying to help the other side reach its objective while 




1982: 33). In such a situation “interdependence is increased” (ibid: 37), making betrayal less 
likely.   
Clinton’s preference was not to prioritize emotion over political decision-making but 
to see the political challenges of reaching peace in terms of emotional traction, and to help do 
this he used empathy “to infer intentions, motivations, positions and interests” in order to 
build more collaborative relations (Holmes and Yarhi-Milo 2017: 107). He saw empathy as a 
tool for acknowledging participants’ differing perspectives and concerns but was able to 
incorporate those concerns into the vision he promoted of a peaceful, stable future.  
Inevitably, Clinton also used his authority and status as president of the United States 
to “reinforce his logic and charm” (Neustadt 1990: 30) in service of a policy agenda. Like 
other presidents before him, he saw that “the power to persuade is the power to bargain” 
(Neustadt 1990: 32). In addition, Clinton’s involvement in the peace process exemplified his 
vision of a new international diplomacy that applied persuasion and “soft power” techniques 
(i.e. listening, offering recognition, and demonstrating respect) rather than just coercion and 
the threat of hard power (Nye 2005).  This more reconciliatory approach (Dobson 2014), 
helped Clinton extract support for his own recommendations, if not always as quickly or as 
comprehensively as he would have liked, and demonstrated the new American diplomatic 
emphasis in the process. An emphasis that would give attention to trust, empathy, and 
supportive engagement but would not jettison the need for more assertive forms of 
intervention in international crises as and when required (and as the Holbrooke negotiations 
show).  
 




          The interview that follows with President Clinton took place in October 2017. 
Arranged through his press office and conducted over an hour at the Clinton Foundation in 
Manhattan, a brief overview of the interview questions was provided in advance. This semi-
structured and taped interview sought to address how Clinton tried to motivate the key 
political players involved in the peace process and how by intervening he was better able to 
help convince those players to accept risks for peace. The interview is verbatim, but 
occasional extra detail in square brackets appears to assist better understanding for the reader. 
 
Spencer: Can you provide some background to attending the Irish forum meeting in 
February 1992 when you were asked about committing to a visa for Gerry Adams and 
[establishing] a Special Envoy for Northern Ireland? 
Clinton: Keep in mind that when we did this, the talks between the Northern Ireland 
parties and [UK Prime Minister] John Major’s governmenti were not yet public, but what we 
wanted to do was get this thing off the dime. We realized that if I came out for an envoy it 
would violate a long-standing understanding between the U.S. and the UK and they [the 
United Kingdom] would be mad, but if we didn’t, then we wouldn’t be making a contribution 
to moving the process forward.  
It was clear that something had to be done and there seemed to be some willingness in 
both communities to engage with this based on what all of our contacts were telling us, and 
they were in regular touch with people in Northern Ireland and [in] the Republic [of Ireland]. 
We finally decided it was worth the risk and believed that if we got lucky we might spark 
some sort of process of change that would actually work. The problem with just having an 
envoy is that, in the end, they [the parties to the conflict] have to make the peace process 




investment conference and then we appointed Mitchell as the envoy out of that. This then 
gave the British some space because although we weren’t declaring what the peace process 
would be and we weren’t putting ourselves in charge of the peace process, we were 
nevertheless putting ourselves in the middle of the economic, social, and political life of 
Northern Ireland more than we had before. 
Spencer: Were there a number of people in the political system that were not only 
unhappy about this but tried to obstruct it? 
Clinton: Indeed, there was, such as, for example, the whole State Department. 
Spencer: How did you field that pressure or objection? Did you just ignore it? 
Clinton: No, I didn’t ignore it. I tried to deal with it. The person I was most worried 
about, for personal reasons, was Warren Christopher, my Secretary of State. He and I were 
close friends, but I thought I could manage that. I was also worried about Admiral [William 
J.] Crowe, the Ambassador to the United Kingdom who had a good military mind and was a 
very shrewd diplomat. I did not want to be at crosshairs with him, but I thought I knew more 
about this issue than he did and I thought that if I did what he and the State Department 
wanted, which was to walk up to the brink one more time, something America had done 
repeatedly, but that I did not keep pushing forward, then not much good would happen. That 
tension really came to a head on the Adams visa. 
Spencer: How did you gauge the risks involved with the Adams visa? 
Clinton: It was significant because if the PIRA were kidding and if Sinn Fein were not 
really speaking for them, then we had problems. You have got to understand – we thought we 
knew what was going on in Northern Ireland politically and on what was going on within 




But there was still some significant risk there. I finally decided when we got a pretty 
clear signal from Gerry Adams that he was serious about exploring peace because we knew 
that this wouldn’t be an easy option for him. The easy option seemed to be to just say no. The 
State Department said no. Even one of the most prominent Irish Americans, the Speaker of 
the House [of Representative] Tom Foley, said no and there were varying divisions within the 
Kennedy clan about whether we should say yes or no. My position was [that] if we said no 
we wouldn’t be criticized, but we would give the people in the republican camp an excuse not 
to go forward. 
Spencer: So was your mind made up early on about accepting the visa request? 
Clinton: I wouldn’t think a president can make a decision of that magnitude alone. My 
mind was made up to take the risk on the special envoy way back in the [presidential] 
primary because I wouldn’t have said it if I wasn’t prepared to take that risk. Sometimes, 
when someone gets into office, they find they can’t keep a commitment made because 
circumstances change but, in this case, it would have been a clear back-off, and I wasn’t 
about to do that unless there was a better alternative. Also, this came up pretty early in my 
tenure, although the conversations between the Major government and the Irish and the 
Northern Ireland parties had been going on, so my strong inclination was to do it even though 
there were significant risks.  
I could have looked like I was a handmaiden to terrorists if it had gone wrong, and, 
don’t forget, we had already had the first World Trade Center attack in 1993 shortly after I 
took office, but I had a feeling, having listened and listened and having thought about it, that 
this was a real opportunity. It’s not fair to say that I went through a bunch of optics to reach 
the decision I had already reached. I owed it to Warren Christopher and, as it turned, out I 




I had a huge agenda before the Congress where I was trying to reverse twelve years of 
President Ronald Reagan’s trickle-down economic policy. I was also trying to do a trade 
agreement with Mexico and Canada, which was controversial within my own party [and] 
which was very tough, but we had [National Security Advisor] Tony Lake, and [Deputy 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] Nancy Soderberg and [Deputy 
National Security Advisor] Sandy Berger all working hard on this. The White House Foreign 
policy team was all in and they believed we should grant the visa based on the aggregate of 
conversations with the relevant parties. The State Department was getting rained down on by 
the British government, as indeed was Ambassador Crowe, because of this, and so there was 
some pressure to face down. 
Spencer: Yet Patrick Mayhew, [the UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland] was 
said to admit later in conversation that you made it easier for the British to engage with the 
PIRA because of moving in the way you did. 
Clinton: They didn’t know what to do and, to be fair, there was a little political rankle 
here which put Major in a bad position. I always felt Major should have got more credit than 
he got for starting this. First, because he had a much narrower mandate in the British 
Parliament than Prime Minister Blair did and, second, because his governing majority 
required the unionists to support him. I did not take any particular pleasure in making his life 
more difficult, but I thought that if we were to have any chance to succeed, we had to keep 
moving. He needed the Irish diaspora in America, and he needed all of us working hard. In 
other words, he needed to have enough “street cred,” as we say in America, to push the 
republican side toward peace, which would eventually include decommissioning and all that 
stuff. And I thought we needed to move then, because it was never going to get any easier, so 




But the other thing you should be reminded of is that Major was taking all sorts of 
grief to his right in the press because he had understandably been pretty open in his support 
for President [George H. W.] Bush when we were running. There were all these stories that 
the Major Government had supported the Bush campaign by looking into my passport file to 
see if I tried to give up my American citizenship in opposition to the Vietnam War. So the 
press was killing Major with this by saying it would ruin the special relationship and I was 
going to screw the British by dealing with my PIRA friends and all of that. The truth is I 
didn’t give five minutes worth of thought to it. I wasn’t upset by it at all. I suppose I would 
have been if there had been any truth to it, but since I knew the whole thing was a last-minute 
desperation move on the other side, I was happy for them to waste their time looking for my 
passport file. I thought he got an unfair press about it for a while because I would never make 
American policy based on personal pique like that, and I can’t think why any American 
president would do that.  
Spencer: When the visa was granted to Gerry Adams how did you see the importance 
of that moment in terms of leverage towards an PIRA ceasefire? 
Clinton: In the background, we got as far as we could possibly get in getting a 
commitment that the visa would lead to a ceasefire. We weren’t just messing around or 
posturing with no ideas. In fairness, I never felt that we were misled by either side and that 
the parties were straight with us. [Ulster Unionist Party Leader David] Trimble and Adams 
were straight with us and Hume, who was out there like a transparent umbrella for the whole 
thing, obviously was. When Adams said before he was able to promise us anything there 
were three things he had to do within the movement we found him to be truthful on that 
score. In time he did those things and, in the end, we got where we needed to be [which was a 
ceasefire, negotiations and an agreement].  




Clinton: Oh sure. Keep in mind that at the same time we were at the high-water mark 
of our efforts to help the Israelis and Palestinians make peace. And in September of 1993 
they had come to the White House and signed the Oslo Accords peace agreement, and when 
Rabin was questioned and criticized about that he reminded everybody that you do not make 
peace with your friends. You are already at peace with your friends, you have to take 
chances. 
So I think we had a lot of wind behind our sails and we weren’t that far away from the 
end of the Cold War. And I think most Americans wanted their president to pull the world 
together now that the Iron Curtain had dropped, the bi-polar world had had its cover 
removed, and everybody could see both the enormous potential as well as the maddening 
dangers that that held. I had the feeling that people in our country, particularly when it came 
to Northern Ireland, wanted us to be a force for peace because of their affection and their 
support for people in both the UK and the Irish Republic. Although many didn’t understand 
the nuances they knew this had been going on for a long time and was a big problem and 
because they liked both sides they supported me in trying to help with the peace process. 
Spencer: How was [the] Canary Wharf [bombing] received in 1996? 
Clinton: We could certainly have done without that. 
Spencer: How did you react? Did you think it was all off? 
Clinton: No. First of all, I was mad about it, but I also understood the kind of 
pressures Adams was under. In every democratic system under stress you want to do two 
things at the same time, hold it together and move it forward – but in doing so you trigger all 
kinds of identity and interest questions. 




Clinton: I mean what was the Brexit vote [ed. note: the UK referendum to leave the 
European Union in 2016] about? What does it mean to be British? What does it mean to be in 
the European Union? What does it mean to be French? What shall we do with our 
immigrants? Anytime you get something like that, if you want to steer it though, the question 
is: when do you feed the beast? Do you let people set off the bomb at Canary Wharf and then 
crack the whip by making it clear to people that if they want peace they have to do this, this, 
and this? There is no magic formula for dealing with such a situation. You are just sort of 
dealing with it as you go along. 
Spencer: Did it give you more weight in a way because that act [the Canary Wharf 
bombing] allowed you to lean on the republican movement even harder? 
Clinton: Yes, because my view was if they wanted a peace agreement then bombing 
Canary Wharf had no long-term strategic logic. If they thought that the British were dragging 
their feet or the British were letting the unionists drag their feet and they did it because they 
wanted to get everybody’s attention, it was very high risk and, thank God, it was not a 
situation where twenty people were killed [two people were killed and more than one 
hundred were injured.]ii. It would seem as though they tried to make it a noisy but low-human 
impact event, although it was clearly a deliberate provocation too. On that basis, I thought 
that it probably meant they still wanted to make peace and either had a renegade, or they were 
giving in, or they were feeding the beast. 
Spencer: Were you close to walking away after Canary Wharf? 
Clinton: No. I think I figured it right, that both sides still wanted it and that even if 
they concluded, for whatever reason, that this was needed or that somebody beyond the 
organization had done it and the people in charge did not want to face the embarrassment of 




the course. Now if it had happened two or three more times, it might have been a different 
story. 
Spencer: Was it important for you not to get bogged down in the details of this 
process because people could then have tried to tie you to intricate questions about policing, 
decommissioning, prisoners, marches, victims, etc.? 
Clinton: It was easier for us than it was for [Prime Minister] Blair because, in law, 
Northern Ireland was still a part of the United Kingdom and if this was going to get the 
British Parliament to give their blessing to this peace agreement – which included special 
relationships with the Republic of Ireland, shared decision-making, majority rule, minority 
rights, all of that – they were necessarily going to have to be involved more in the detail on 
areas like policing because that was where British government concessions had to be made. It 
was more important for us to basically create the conditions that would maximize the chances 
of making peace and then set up a process that would make sure that a sensible decision 
would be made. Remember, the United States did not have to live under or live with any of 
the detail and in some ways if we had tried to over-involve ourselves with the detail it would 
have undermined our influence. On the other hand, once George Mitchell morphed his role 
from the Special Envoy for Trade and Investment into the Special Envoy for the peace 
process, he had to know as much about that as anybody else, and he had to be able to push 
people to specify how they were for what they were for or against what they were against, 
and then consider how he could bridge gaps. If we had waded in too hard on one side or the 
other on some of these issues a) we would have looked tone deaf and arrogant since we did 
not have to live with the consequences and b) we would have undermined Mitchell’s ability 
to drive people to their own decisions. It’s hard enough to sell one of these things under any 
circumstances but knowing that your own representatives made the deal makes it easier, and 




because there may be no way to bridge the divide. However, that is an argument for waiting 
as long as is possible to say you need A, B or C. You have to keep in mind that other people 
are living with the consequences. 
Spencer: The Irish often talked about the power of informal negotiation. Is a lunch, a 
drink, or a relaxed one-to-one situation a better way of doing business, and, indeed, is it 
closer to the American way of doing business? 
Clinton: I would say yes, although there aren’t many people in Northern Ireland and 
many seem to know each other. But the isolation had been so steep for so long that maybe we 
did have some effect on changing the culture, and I believe that. I tried to use St Patrick’s 
Day at the White House for this, and we always did the formal thing, where the Irish 
Taoiseach would show up and give me the shamrock in the Irish crystal during the daytime, 
and then I would try to have an evening event every year and to invite a fair number of 
people from the parties and not just the biggest ones and then use those opportunities for me 
and others to have one-on-one totally off-the-record conversations. Even if we didn’t do 
anything but drink Irish whiskey and talk about our families, it was really important because 
if you look at all this trouble with nationalism raging in the world today, the success of that 
strategy requires the objectifying of people. It requires you to become an object defined by 
your [demographic] characteristics rather than being seen as a human being. If you want to 
make a peace, you have to melt the iceberg, you have to become a precedent because, in the 
end, when you put your name on that document it is not worth a nickel if you are not a person 
of your word. 
Spencer: And so therefore trust is central? 
Clinton: Yes, and trust is the democratic element in shortest supply today. Then I 




Spencer: What about the symbolism of things like the handshake? Of being seen on 
the Falls Road [this is the main road through West Belfast’s republican neighborhood] 
shaking the hand of Gerry Adams? How much attention and consideration goes into a gesture 
like that and how much of it is spontaneous? 
Clinton: In my initial forays it was all thought through. When I visited the Shankill 
[this is the main road through West Belfast’s unionist neighborhood.] and the Falls, I wanted 
the people to see me and that I wasn’t running away from Sinn Fein or pretending that they 
were something they weren’t. But I was also saying we have to build a different tomorrow, 
which was important. It was important to say I was not dumping on, or looking down on, or 
de-legitimizing the unionists but that they had to find a way to share the future, and so I gave 
an enormous amount of thought about how to do that and what to say where. We wanted to 
do a big event in Derry [known formally as Londonderry, this is Northern Ireland’s second 
largest city and is predominantly Catholic.] for obvious reasons and we wanted to do the 
Christmas tree lighting in Belfast for obvious reasons. I wanted to spend the night as 
American President at the Europa for obvious reasons [a hotel in Belfast which has a 
reputation for being the most bombed hotel in western Europe] and I thought about that. I am 
big on spontaneity when it comes to human contact, but on the first trip we could not afford a 
wrong step and we couldn’t afford to have one side or the other think that we weren’t an 
honest broker, so a lot of it was thought through. 
Spencer: In terms of whose hand you shake first, surely that could be interpreted in 
various ways. So, how did you try and guarantee, as best you could, balance in that situation?  
Clinton: My recollection is we got lucky in that the decision we made was based on 
how to fit the best traffic flow. You could say I just drove into town and I stopped here and 
then I went there. And that was factually true, given where the airport was. Maybe we would 




from town. I don’t remember all the conversation that went into it, but we thought that since 
the United States had long been an ally of the UK and since I came from Northern Irish 
Protestant stock, that we ought to give a go at Sinn Fein first and reach out to the Catholics. 
Spencer: So that was factored into the decision? 
Clinton: I just thought it was the easiest thing to do. It was going to be the most 
newsworthy thing to do. Nobody would have been surprised if an American president shook 
hands with a unionist, so when I was thinking about this and we were having conversations 
we came to the decision that people would take our meetings with the unionists more 
seriously because they would see that we were determined to be fair and we are not just here 
for a quick trip. My main concern, once you got the first [photographic] shots right, was that 
the people would then believe that this is a very serious engagement from us and that we had 
no intention of pushing anything down anybody else’s throat. We knew perfectly well that 
anything agreed would have to be adopted by people in both communities and that once we 
had done the “peace is here” stuff, . . .movement in this direction had to be real. But, what 
was most important was that they trusted me and trusted us and believed whatever we said 
was what we believed, too. If we made a commitment, then we had to keep it. 
Spencer: What was the significance of the late-night phone calls on Good Friday for 
you when you made yourself available all night to address concerns, questions and requests 
for help to understand the dynamics of what was going from leaders of the political parties? 
What were you saying in those calls and what were you trying to do? 
Clinton: I was trying to pull the ball over the goal line. 
Spencer: How?  
Clinton: Well, I was very familiar with the issues. I knew where they were. George 




if you ever show impatience – and there is a time for impatience, but not when you are 
hearing the stories for the first time, because then, if you show impatience – it’s like saying I 
am more important than you, which pisses people off. It’s like saying: your losses and your 
family’s losses, your side’s losses, aren’t all that important to me and your aspirations and 
your dreams, your children’s dreams are simply factors in an equation I am trying to work. 
You can’t do that. You have got to be a good listener. Listening is a dignifying, empowering, 
trust-building experience. 
Spencer: But then at what point do you start to press? 
Clinton: First of all, there is no hard and fast rule, but when the people you are 
listening to start to repeat themselves and no new issue is raised, that is worthy of 
consideration. Then you have to say to people: you can kill this at any time, but if everybody 
has been heard on everything that matters, we are now going to start making progress or we 
are not, and, if so, how do you suggest we do that? That’s the way you do it. You don’t have 
to insult anybody. I was guided by Mitchell, Tony Blair, and Bertie Ahern as to what they 
thought I ought to do. I couldn’t sleep anyway, and by then I had spent enough time with all 
the major players that, if I were to call them at three o’clock in the morning my time, it was a 
way of saying “America really cares about this and we are with you.” Maybe it had the 
dramatic effect. I also knew them all by then because we had been at this for years, so it 
wasn’t like I was some stranger talking. In a way, it was no big deal for David Trimble if I 
called him because he talked to me all the time. But, on the other hand, if he knew it was 3:00 
or 4:00 in the morning, he knew I really did care and I wouldn’t leave him in the lurch if he 
made a certain compromise. Similarly, Gerry [Adams] knew I wouldn’t leave him in the 
lurch if he made a compromise and that was about all I did. The lion’s share of the credit goes 





Spencer: An Irish official said to me the longer you are involved in a process like this 
the less chance you are going to walk away. Did you see it like that or for you was it based 
more on the symbolism of events, personal obligation, and responsibility? 
Clinton: All of the above but there is something else, and I think secretly all political 
participants in a peace process hope they may escape this phenomenon, which is that the 
people who are most likely to get hurt in terms of their long-term political aspirations are 
those who have worked the hardest to bring about the peace deal. So, for example, John 
Hume spends his life working on this, but once the peace deal is made people think maybe 
we had better vote Sinn Fein because they are tougher David Trimble is in a totally different 
culture full of old-fashioned rigidity and reluctance, but he sticks his neck out and the biggest 
beneficiary is the guy who comes down on him hardest, Ian Paisley [in the elections 
following the agreement, the Social Democratic and Labour Party and the Ulster Unionist 
Party both lost power respectively to Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party and at the 
time of writing there has been no functioning government in Northern Ireland for over two 
years. The issue of trust in Northern Ireland continues to a problem]. After Paisley gets into 
power he turns out to be pretty responsible and works with [Sinn Fein leader] Martin 
McGuinness and others, but it is likely that if you do something like this, which so 
fundamentally changes the established order of things, you have to be prepared for the fact 
that as the forward-leaner you may be the first one decapitated. Even if people vote for what 
you ask them to vote for, they can then they say, “OK, we are now in this boat so we had 
better get the toughest person we can to steer our side of it.” 
Spencer: Did you think that in getting the extremes into the middle the moderates 
would get pushed out in the process? 
Clinton: I did, and I worried about it. As it turned out, there were times when the 




Castle is where the Parliament of Northern Ireland meets] and much of that was unavoidable 
psychologically because when you vote for a new order, as in the case of unionists, by a quite 
thin majority, you are precarious because a bunch of people who didn’t vote for it are going 
to want to be represented by the most ardent unionists they can find. Those who voted for it 
wanted the most trenchant representatives to achieve the best deal possible and it’s the same 
on the other side. It’s just basic human psychology. 
Spencer: If you have two sides in a peace process you have incumbents and 
challengers where one side wants change and the other resists it, so you have an imbalance to 
the negotiation system. How do you try and calibrate that? 
Clinton: What I tried to do was, first of all, you have to try to get them to tilt it. It’s 
their lives, not ours. What I and our people argued was that, if you are a unionist the reason 
you should use for changing is that there are certain things that others are going to take away 
from you, and you know it anyway. All this trouble is bad for you and it’s bad for Northern 
Ireland to be less well off than Ireland. It’s bad for you not to have functioning and flowing 
economics and immigration between the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, and the Irish 
Republic. And the demographics are not working for you because the republican community 
is having a larger average family size and because in order for you to modernize your 
economy you have to take in immigrants. Nobody knows if it’s going to change the 
demographics in eight years or twelve, but, at some point, the old order is going to be swept 
away, so it’s better for you to get in now and fashion it so it’s fair for you whether you are in 
the majority or the minority and I really pushed that hard. 
Spencer: Did you assist Trimble’s negotiation position? How did you try and 




Clinton: When I was trying to influence someone, whoever it was, I tried never to tell 
them why they should do what I wanted them to do. I spent an enormous amount of time 
thinking about what I believed their interest was and the people they represented, and I tried 
to spend whatever time I could to understand how they saw the world, what their 
responsibility was to their own people and what their long-term goals were. And then I 
always made an argument [to] whoever I was talking to – whether it was [Russian President] 
Boris Yeltsin or the parties in the Irish process or [in] South Africa – where I would say, “It 
seems to me this is what your interest is.” If you are going to help other people make peace 
you have to empower them to do it. Unless you are prepared essentially to take their country 
over and assume responsibility for its defense and social-economic welfare, you have to 
empower people. 
Spencer: But you also have to get them to face up to their own fear, don’t you? 
Clinton: Yes, you do, and you have to simplify it. You have to say the role of the 
United States in the Irish peace process is to maximize the benefits of peace and minimize its 
perils. This was the case when we made the Wye River accord in the Middle East peace 
process,iii which was the last major handover of land, when I said to the guys if they made a 
final peace deal they were going to kill each other for at least three years and then there 
would be later attempts to kill both of them. I said my job is to do everything I could to keep 
them alive and also benefit people.  
You can’t lie to people because if you pretend there are no downsides to making 
peace, you look like a fool and people know better if you are in any kind of combustible 
circumstance. So, my view was that the best thing the United States could do, aside from 
listen and build trust and make arguments from other people’s points of view, was to say, “I 
may be wrong, but as I see it, it’s in your best interests to do X because. . .” That is at least 




not.” The big risk is that it could cost you your life. [Yitzhak] Rabin was killed because he 
took a chance on peace, so you have to say the job of the United States and any personal 
commitment is to maximize the benefits of an agreement and minimize its perils. 
Spencer: A lot of this is empathy and putting yourself in people’s shoes, but is 
empathy dangerous in that it can allow people to prevaricate and avoid doing things? 
Clinton: Well you know you also have to be brutally frank about what they have to 
do, which is not pleasant. Any kind of a deal that has got any chance of succeeding in a 
complex environment will require people to make decisions they would otherwise just as 
soon not make. You can’t avoid that, and you shouldn’t be “yes people,” but be level about 
that. The point I am trying to make is that it is important not to promise people things you 
can’t provide. I could promise, in the Irish case, to accelerate trade and investment, create 
opportunities, etc. But I couldn’t promise, for example, that there would never be a renegade 
faction of the IRA. All you can do is make it clear that whatever the heck happens, I will not 
be a sunshine friend here and that if you sign up to this deal, I will ride with you right until 
the end. So, you try to get as much upside and as little downside as is humanly possible. 
Spencer: What did you learn from this about negotiation and the art of leadership? 
Clinton: I was discovering, first of all, that the more these people really get to know 
each other the more likely they were to make a deal even though the issues didn’t get any 
easier. I was stunned when I got into the Middle East peace process how much a lot of those 
people knew each other and what they knew about each other’s families, how they tell jokes 
to each other, and still they couldn’t get there. When you think you know a lot of rules about 
negotiations and you know this, that, and the other, something will come up and show you 
that you were wrong and underestimating. Some absolutely bone-headed move will come up 




Spencer: Is that why, in your view, the Northern Ireland process stuck and the Middle 
East process did not stick? 
Clinton: It began in my opinion with [PLO leader Yassir] Arafat turning down the 
deal that I got the Israelis to accept at the end of my tenure, and it led to the defeat of the 
peace forces in Israel, and then he died and the critical powers bifurcated, [as the PLO split 
into Fatah and Hamas] so they lost the historic chance. He knew it and that was what was so 
crazy, so maddening. I said, “Do you want to this before I leave office?” and he said, “Yes, 
because it will be another five or ten years before we get another chance.” And it’s now been 
seventeen. 
Spencer: Do you think there are ripe moments for a process? 
Clinton: Absolutely. If you are the outsider, you can’t do for somebody something 
they don’t want to do for themselves. All you can do is make it easier for them to deal with 
what they are otherwise inclined to do. If you know deep inside that you ought to do this, and 
you want to do it, and you want to do it for your kids and grandkids, then the United States is 
in a fairly solid position to make an enormous contribution. But if you are not ready to give 
up the clenched fist for the outstretched hand there is not much the rest of us can do about it. 
You can give a lot of speeches and talk about United Nation resolutions, but there is only so 
much you can do.  
Even with carrots and sticks there are limits unless, as I said, you want to take total 
responsibility for the country. [United States President] Lyndon Johnson once gave a speech 
when he was in his twenties and was running for Congress in the presence of the Speaker of 
the House [of Representatives] Sam Rayburn, and Johnson called his opponent all these 
names and gave this hellfire and brimstone speech, and asked Sam Rayburn what he thought 




Lyndon, but I have found in a long life that it is best not to tell someone to go to hell unless 
you can make them go, and that in my experience there are damn few people you can make 
go to hell.” And it’s worth remembering because what he is saying is this is part science and 
part art. 
Spencer: Do you mean art in terms of performance? 
Clinton: Yes. You also have to have sticks as well as carrots but even the stick should 
be applied while making it clear that other people have the power in decision-making and the 
consequences of that will flow.  
 
Conclusion 
As this interview indicates, President Clinton’s approach in Northern Ireland was shaped by 
both motivation and intervention. He promoted the need for greater collaboration and 
compromise amongst the political parties and his own role was illustrative of an inclusive 
mediation approach. His approach was also consistent with a more general view he held that 
peace agreements were ultimately matters of public persuasion, which would help explain the 
emphasis he gave to motivational speeches and the effort he gave to prodding, cajoling, 
encouraging and even flattering protagonists to accept risks for peace (Harris 2006: 416). His 
strategy of engaging across and with the political parties and the British and Irish 
governments reduced perceptions of bias, and the sense that he was working to a self-serving 
political agenda. This also enhanced the credibility of America as an honest broker in the 
peace process. 
The interview highlights Clinton’s belief in the value of listening, patience, trust-
building, and inter-personal engagement and being attentive to different political reactions to 




patience too can become a problem. His argument that impatience may become necessary 
once the parties have made their positions known is perhaps also more complex than  it 
sounds (Mitchell put up with the same positions being repeated for years) because if 
impatience is impressed too early it can destroy respect, trust and progress. The expression 
‘when to hold and when to fold’ comes to mind here. Clinton emphasised how listening was 
more likely to yield positive results if part of a dialogue rather than being only a monologue 
(it is said that Clinton would often let other leaders speak first before he pronounced on 
policy moves (Harris 2006: 417)); indicating the value of a soft (supportive), rather than hard 
(coercive), exercise of power (Nye 2005).  
 
In describing his one-on-one contacts with the key players of the peace process, 
Clinton points to the role of emotional impact and the power of respect that comes from such 
interaction. His focus on the “big picture” helped him avoid involved getting bogged down 
on the minutiae of substance (this was not the case in President Carter’s peace negotiations 
with the Israelis and the Egyptians in 1978 where his leadership of that process demanded 
more intense engagement with detail and substance (Wright 2015)), therefore avoiding the 
problem of compounding intransigence. A “big picture” emphasis also provided more room 
for manoeuvring parties and benefited from the ambiguity of the early stages of the process 
(once the implementation of the agreement came into play and responsibilities became clearer 
this was far less effective), where rigidity was less prevalent as political parties were trying to 
adapt to the movement of the process. 
Clinton maintained a commitment to engagement despite the challenge of the Canary 
Wharf bombing and his continued support for the peace process and Sinn Fein’s involvement 
after the bombing enabled Clinton to exercise even more influence over Sinn Fein as a result. 




obstructions (mainly caused by lack of trust) that were holding the process up (Mallie and 
McKittrick 2001; Campbell 2007: 2013) 
Significantly, much of his commentary in this interview reflects his focus on the 
psychological dynamics rather than specific policy goals. Perhaps this is not surprising given 
that Clinton’s priority was to appeal to disputants’ imaginations and encourage them to focus 
on the possibilities for positive change. In demonstrating his own commitment to the peace 
process by taking risks as well as making supportive interventions (even if calculated as with 
the Adams visa) Clinton was, in turn, able to make reciprocal gestures more likely and so 
increase his influence in the process. But perhaps we should acknowledge, too, that Clinton’s 
influence had a better chance of success in Northern Ireland given the foundations of a peace 
process were in place before his involvement (as they were) and therefore that his role came 
to both reinforce and symbolise the opportunity (ripeness) for change that many were hoping 
for (the concept of ripeness has been well used in conflict resolution literature and even 
though there is a tendency to be less forthcoming on where the origins of ripeness might be 
found, or how the conditions might be created to facilitate it, there are nevertheless useful 
contributions on how it important it is to be mindful of shifts in the political atmosphere and 
tentative attempts by participants in conflict to reach out (Haass 1990: 138-150)).  
Economic incentives certainly played a role in ending the Northern Ireland conflict 
and Clinton’s appointment of George Mitchell as economic envoy to Northern Ireland (before 
he became chairman of the negotiations), highlighted the relationship between economic 
opportunity and political activity. Economic development was an important consideration for 
Carter in his 1977 initiative on Ireland so investment are have historical precedent here too. 
 New presidents, especially those of another political party, often take different 
diplomatic approaches to their predecessors; seeking to demonstrate leadership capabilities 




this, supportive diplomacy can change to assertive forms of engagement. This was the case 
during the post-Good Friday Agreement phase when Clinton’s successor, President George 
W. Bush, took a more authoritative approach and intensified pressure on republicans to 
commit to decommissioning and to accept new policing and justice arrangements (Clancy 
2016), both of which were obstructing progress. In that instance, Bush was less disposed than 
Clinton to fielding the constant concerns and contentions that arose between the parties but 
chose to make interventions more in moments of acute difficulty or provocation (particularly 
in relation to republican criminality). Strategically, Bush would have known it would be 
unlikely he could exceed the popularity of Clinton on Northern Ireland, but he remained 
wedded to the peace process and believed he could continue to contribute positively to it 
(Marsden 2006).  
As a peace process advances, understanding and anticipation about what it can and 
should deliver can lead to possibilities narrowing and allow the dangers of win-lose, zero-
sum politics to re-emerge, as parties return to the safety of polarised and divisive positions. 
That is where Northern Ireland is today. Couple that tension with the confusion and fear of 
Brexit, along the sectarianism that continues to keep Northern Ireland from breaking with the 
animosities of the past (Independent Reporting Commission 2018), and one can see how a 
peace process is never conclusively over. 
Overall, the success of the peace process in Northern Ireland is representative of its 
foundations, aspirations, and a collective commitment on the part of the disputants’ and their 
supporters to see conflict ended and, in that, Clinton’s role was central. He displayed the 
“curiosity, ambition and determination” needed to act as a leader of influence (MacMillan 
2015: 147), and he was able to cultivate an emotional attachment to the possibilities of peace. 
From the trust he developed with the political parties he was also able to both motivate and 




the case especially in the final stages leading up to the Good Friday Agreement (Campbell 
2007: 295, 315, 413; Campbell 2013: 53, 94, 113).  
Clinton also articulated (to the British government) that the achievement of political 
goals should be given priority over how those political goals are defined, that one should stop 
talking about what one has done and start talking about what one is going to do (Campbell 
2007: 96), and understand that it is important to “never stop communicating” (Campbell 
2013: 303). Clinton’s skill in keeping the emphasis forward-looking and his ability to give 
this momentum personal appeal is also highlighted by Tony Blair’s strategist and spin-doctor 
Alistair Campbell who saw Clinton at close quarters throughout the run-up to the Good 
Friday Agreement. On Clinton Campbell recalls “how brilliant he was at connecting, not just 
through what he said, but how he said it, through the pictures he painted in words, and 
through body language, but above all through making the most of what he knew and what 
people told him. You always had the feeling with Clinton that he was just hoovering up other 
people’s stories and experiences, because they interested him, but also because he could use 
them” (Campbell 2013: 242). 
           It may well be the case that Clinton got involved in Northern Ireland primarily because 
he thought he could make a difference and that he was fascinated by the challenge of trying 
to resolve the “longest remaining unresolved problem in Europe” (Mallie and McKittrick 
1996: 286); that his own motivation was largely personal. But, we should also recognise how 
he was acting in the long American tradition of promoting peace and democracy too and that 
his inventions were consistent with broader policy goals of democratic enlargement that he 
favoured (Dempsey 2004: 200-201). 
           The importance of motivation and intervention together help us better understand the 
value of Clinton’s role in the Northern Ireland peace process and even though his ability to 




Clinton still believes in the motivational emphasis. At a commemorative event in Washington 
in 2018 to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement Clinton ignored the 
problems that were bedevilling the peace process at that point and spoke about how the 
anniversary offered “an opportunity to recommit to the spirit of courage and co-operation that 
made the Good Friday Agreement possible in the first place.” He advised his audience to 
“seize the moment” and “move into the future together” (Clinton 2018). It could have been 
1995 all over again. 
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i The support of Edward M. Kennedy, a powerful senator from Massachusetts and scion of 
the United States’ most well-known Irish-American family had been a long-standing 
opponent of the PIRA who had initially opposed the visa but changed his mind following 
conversations with John Hume, the leader of Northern Ireland’s Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) and representatives of the Irish Government (Kennedy 2009: 460-463). 
ii John Major of the Conservative Party was Prime Minister of the UK from 1990 until 1997 
when he was succeeded by Tony Blair of the Labor Party. 
iii The bombing that ended the IRA ceasefire on February 9, 1996 actually took place in the 
London Docklands, which are outside Canary Wharf. The truck bomb devastated a large area, 
leaving a 32 foot-wide crater, and caused more than 150 million pounds worth of damage.  
ivThe Wye River Memorandum was an agreement negotiated in Maryland and signed in the 
White House by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestine Liberation 
Organization leader Yasser Arafat in October 1998. The memorandum called for the transfer 
of some land in the West Bank from Israel to the Palestinian Authority. 
